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THE APPLICATION OF THE TAX BENEFIT
RULE TO CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS
OF EXPENSED ASSETS UNDER
I.R.C. SECTION 336
When a taxpayer deducts an item from gross income but later recovers its value,
the amount recovered is treated as income and must be recognized to the extent of
the previous tax benefit. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits have, however, split on the
applicability of this doctrine to corporate liquidations of expensed assets under sec-
tion 336 of the Internal Revenue Code. Using their decisions as aframework, this
Note examines the precise denition of "recovery" within the meaning of the tax
beneft rule as applied to corporate liquidations. The Note concludes that, although
the Sixth Circuit properly invoked the tax benefit rule, the doctrine itsetf is of limited
application in the context of corporate liquidations and should not be used unless
recovery, in its traditional sense, has occurred.
INTRODUCTION
T HE FEDERAL TAX LAW treats a corporation and its sharehold-
ers as separate entities, each obliged to pay tax on its own in-
come.' Therefore, a transaction involving a sale, exchange, or
other disposition of assets between a corporation and one of its
shareholders gives rise to a taxable event resulting in realization of
gain or loss by each party.2 This gain or loss must be recognized
for purposes of computing taxable income, unless deferred or ex-
empted from recognition by another provision of the Internal
Revenue Code.3
Section 336 of the Code4 is one such nonrecognition provision.
Under section 336, no gain or loss is recognized by a corporation
on the distribution of its property pursuant to liquidation. Conse-
quently, the liquidating corporation is never taxed on the differ-
ence between the fair market value and the basis of property
1. I.R.C. §§ 1, 11; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). If the shareholder
group includes corporations, the consolidated return provisions of ch. 6 may apply. I.R.C.
§§ 1501-1564. See generally B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1.01 (3d ed. 1971). For an analysis of the abolition
of the corporate income tax and the attribution of corporate income to shareholders, see
Gabinet & Coffey, The Implications of the Economic Concept of Income for Corporation-
Shareholder Income Tax Systems, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 895 (1977).
2. I.R.C. § 1001(a).
3. Id § 1001(c).
4. "Except as provided in section 453(d) (relating to disposition of installment obli-
gations), no gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the distribution of property
in partial or complete liquidation." Id § 336.
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distributed in kind to shareholders, even though that property has
been distributed to an independent entity in an otherwise taxable
event. Because this difference between fair market value and basis
escapes taxation, the Internal Revenue Service is often anxious to
avoid or override section 336 and tax the liquidating corporation
on the liquidation transaction.5 The availability of both statutory
6
and judicial7 exceptions to section 336 has aided the Service in its
attempts to do so.
One such judicial doctrine-one which the Service has re-
cently urged with success4-is the tax benefit rule. The tax benefit
rule provides that if an item deducted from gross income in a
prior year is recovered in a later year, the amount recovered must
be included in gross income to the extent of the previous tax bene-
fit.9 In order to determine whether the rule is applicable to corpo-
rate liquidations of expensed assets,' 0 two questions must be
answered: (1) whether tax deductions for assets purchased and
fully expensed are recovered when the assets are distributed in
kind to shareholders pursuant to a plan of liquidation, and (2) if
the deductions are recovered, whether the tax benefit rule super-
sedes the nonrecognition provision of section 336.
This Note examines the precise definition of "recovery" within
the meaning of the tax benefit rule and section 336 liquidations."
5. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 1, 111.61, at 11-47. It is possible that even
without § 336, a corporate liquidation would not give rise to a taxable event. See text
accompanying notes 174-83 infra.
6. The statutory exceptions to the general rule of nonrecognition of § 336 are: (a)
depreciation recapture under § 1245 (personal property and certain other tangible prop-
erty); (b) depreciation recapture under § 1250 (depreciable realty); (c) recapture under
§ 1251 (farm losses); (d) recapture under § 1252 (soil and water conservation and land
clearing deductions); (e) investment credit recapture under § 47; (t) the power of the Com-
missioner under § 482 to allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between
related taxpayers; and (g) the power of the Commissioner under § 446(b) to change a tax-
payer's method of accounting to clearly reflect income.
7. The major judicially created exception to § 336 is the "assignment of income"
doctrine, which states that income must be taxed to the entity which earned the income and
not to the entity which ultimately received the income. See, e.g., Williamson v. United
States, 292 F.2d 524 (Ct. Cl. 1961) and note 67 infra.
8. See Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1219 (1979).
9. E.g., Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 380 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
See generally I J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 7.34 (1974 rev. ed.).
The rule has been partially codified in I.R.C. § Ill, which requires its application in the
context of bad debt deductions.
10. Those assets which are purchased and deducted rather than capitalized and depre-
ciated will hereinafter be referred to as "expensed assets."
11. Apart from its use in the context of corporate liquidations, "recovery" has meant
the receipt of payments of debts previously deducted as worthless, the refund of taxes pre-
1979]
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This issue has been litigated only twice. In 1963, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided Commissioner v. South Lake
Farms, Inc. 12 and held that the tax benefit rule did not override
section 336. In 1978, however, the Sixth Circuit ruled, in Tennes-
see-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Commissioner,'3 that the tax
benefit rule precluded nonrecognition in a section 336 liquidation.
Using these two cases as a framework, this analysis examines the
relationship between the tax benefit rule and corporate liquida-
tions of expensed property.
In order to determine whether gain should be recognized by a
corporation when it distributes assets upon liquidation, this Note
first outlines the purposes and functions of section 336 and its
companion provision, section 337.4 The analysis then focuses on
the reasoning of South Lake Farms and Tennessee-Carolina in the
context of those provisions 5 and the tax benefit rule,'6 including
an examination of the "inconsistent event,"' 7 "fictional recov-
ery,"" s and "treasury stock" theories 9 offered by the court of ap-
peals in Tennessee-Carolina. Finally, after concluding that
Tennessee-Carolina was correctly decided on its facts,20 this Note
demonstrates the limited utility of the tax benefit rule in section
336 liquidations by illustrating that the rule's recovery require-
ment is not always satisfied in the context of a corporate liquida-
tion.21
I. THE NATURE OF THE GAIN UPON CORPORATE LIQUIDATION
An analysis of the applicability of the tax benefit rule to the
liquidation of expensed assets must include an examination of sec-
viously deducted, insurance compensation for losses deducted, the sale of assets previously
deducted as worthless, and the elimination of a liability which has accrued and has been
deducted, all of which result in an increase in the taxpayer's net assets or equity. 1 J.
MERTENS, supra note 9, at §§ 7.35-.37(2) (and cases cited therein). Seegenerally Bittker &
Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 265 (1978).
12. 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963).
13. 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1219 (1979).
14. See text accompanying notes 23-50 infra. In general, section 337 provides that a
corporation shall not recognize gain or loss on a sale or exchange made pursuant to a
corporate liquidation plan. See text accompanying notes 42-44 infra.
15. See text accompanying notes 51-102 infra.
16. See text accompanying notes 104-12 infra.
17. See text accompanying notes 119-47 infra.
18. See text accompanying notes 148-73 infra.
19. See text accompanying notes 174-83 infra.
20. See text accompanying note 199 infra.
21. See text accompanying notes 184-99 infra.
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tion 336 as it relates to the liquidation provisions of the Code22 to
determine when and by whom gain must be recognized in the
complete liquidation process.
Though the nonrecognition principle of section 336 was not
codified until 1954,23 the principle was applied prior to that time
first by the Board of Tax Appeals,24 and later under the regula-
tions.25 The rule may be simply stated: a corporation recognizes
no gain or loss on the distribution of its assets in kind pursuant to
complete liquidation.
Prior to the 1954 Code, the liquidation of assets in kind to
shareholders was the only method by which a corporation could
liquidate without recognition of gain. Thus, the shareholders of a
corporation contemplating liquidation would encourage the cor-
poration to transfer the assets to the shareholders for subsequent
sale to third parties, thereby avoiding the corporate recognition of
gain which would result if the corporation sold the assets and dis-
tributed the proceeds to the shareholders. Under the sharehold-
ers' plan, the corporation would distribute the assets to the
shareholders at no gain,26 the shareholders would recognize a gain
(probably at capital gain rates) on the difference between their ba-
sis in the stock and the fair market value of the assets,27 and the
shareholders would take a fair market value basis in the assets.28
The assets could then be sold by the shareholders immediately at
no further profit.
If, however, th6 corporation sold the assets, the net proceeds
available to the shareholders would be reduced by the tax liability
accruing on the gain recognized by the corporation on the sale.
The shareholders would receive less than the fair market value of
the corporate assets and would recognize taxable gain on the re-
ceipt of the proceeds.2 9 Therefore, before 1954, if the corporation
sold the assets, gain was recognized by both the corporation and
the shareholders; however, if the shareholders sold the assets, only
22. I.R.C. §§ 33 1-37.
23. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68 Stat. 106 (codified at
I.R.C. § 336).
24. E.g., Stockyard Bank of Cincinnati v. Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 964 (1932); Gould
v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 824 (1930).
25. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-20, Internal Revenue Code of 1939.
26. Id
27. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 115(c), 53 Stat. 46 (now I.R.C. § 331).
28. Id, ch. 2, § 113(a)(15), 53 Stat. 40 (now I.R.C. § 334(a)).
29. Id, ch. 2, § 115(c), 53 Stat. 46 (now I.R.C. § 331(a)(1)). If the amount received in
the distribution exceeded the shareholder's adjusted basis in the stock, he would recognize
a capital gain on the excess. Id
1979]
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the shareholders recognized gain.3°
While there was no question which liquidation plan afforded
the maximum tax advantage, the courts had to distinguish be-
tween the two transactions. In Commissioner v. Court Holding
Co.,3 I a corporation, wishing to sell its property, distributed the
property to its shareholders who then transferred title to the pur-
chaser.32 The Supreme Court imputed the sale of the property to
the corporation, thereby compelling the corporation to recognize
gain on the sale in addition to the gain the shareholders realized on
liquidation.33 In Court Holding, the Supreme Court looked be-
yond the form of the transaction-the transfer of legal title-to
the actual substance of the matter as revealed by the facts. Since
the shareholders arranged for the sale of the property on behaf of
the corporation, the Court reasoned that, in reality, the corpora-
tion had itself sold the property, thus mandating that the gain be
taxed at the corporate level.34 The lesson of Court Holding was
clear: shareholders who wished to sell corporate assets and to
avoid tax at the corporate level would have to do so in their capac-
ity as individuals, not as representatives of the corporation.35
The shareholders in United States v. Cumberland Public Service
Co. 36 did just that. They received the corporate assets at liquida-
tion and later sold them to a third person.37 The Supreme Court
distinguished Cumberland from Court Holding on its facts and
held that a bona fide corporate liquidation and sale of assets by
the shareholders had occurred.3" Therefore, only the shareholders
recognized gain on the liquidation, and the corporation was not
taxed on the sale. The Court acknowledged that the "distinction
between sales by a corporation as compared with a distribution in
kind followed by shareholder sales may be particularly shadowy
and artificial. . . ,,39 Nevertheless, the Court felt that the statu-
tory scheme required the distinction.'
30. For a graphic illustration of this dichotomy see B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra
note 1, 11.63, at 11-53.
31. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
32. Id at 333.
33. Id at 334.
34. Id
35. B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 1, 1 11.63, at 11-55.
36. 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
37. Id at 452-53.
38. Id at 456.
39. Id at 454.
40. Id at 455.
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In response to Court Holding and Cumberland,4' Congress en-
acted section 33742 as a companion to the section 336 codification
of the general nonrecognition rule.43 Within certain limitations, 44
section 337 provides that a corporation shall not recognize gain or
loss on a sale or exchange of property made after the adoption of a
corporate liquidation plan. Therefore, under sections 336 and
337, whether a corporation distributes its assets in kind or sells
them outright is irrelevant as long as the sale is within the parame-
ters of section 337. If the transaction falls within the safe harbor
of the nonrecognition provisions, the liquidating corporation is
not taxed.
A logical conclusion derived from the enactment of section 337
in conjunction with section 336 is this: in a corporate liquidation,
as long as the assets are sold pursuant to a plan of liquidation
under section 337,45 gain will be taxed only at the shareholder
level. Thus, the formalistic distinction between Court Holding
and Cumberland is eliminated, and the purpose reflected by the
legislative history is accomplished. 6
In both South Lake Farms4 7 and Tennessee-Carolina41 the
41. Section 337 . . . concerns the problems raised by the decisions in Commis-
sioner v. Court Holding Company. . . and U.S. v. Cumberland Public Service
Co ... and the numerous related cases. These decisions involve the question of
whether the corporation or the shareholder effected a sale of property in connec-
tion with the liquidation of the corporation. Under the decision in Cumberland
Public Service Co., supra, it is indicated that in the case of a distribution of prop-
erty in liquidation of a corporation followed by its sale made in fact by its share-
holders, a single tax is imposed at the shareholder level. Where the shareholders
in fact did not effect the sale, tax is imposed both at the corporate and at the share-
holder level. Accordingly, under present law the tax consequences arising from
sales made in the course of liquidations may depend primarily upon the formal
manner in which the transactions are arranged. Your committee intends in sec-
tion 337 to provide a definitive rule which will eliminate the present uncertainties.
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 49, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4621, 4896 (emphasis added).
42. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 106 (codified at
I.R.C. § 337).
43. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68 Stat. 106 (codified at
I.R.C. § 336).
44. See I.R.C. § 337(c).
45. If the format of the liquidation plan does not satisfy the requirements of § 337, the
courts must consider the distinction between Court Holding and CumberlandPublic Service.
See notes 26-40 supra and accompanying text and note 165 infra. It is also important to
note that a second gain may be taxed on a corporate liquidation under the exceptions
discussed in notes 6 & 7 supra even though the formal requirements of § 337 are satisfied.
46. See note 41 supra.
47. Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963).
48. Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1219 (1979).
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original shareholders recognized gain on the sale of their stock to
the parent corporation under the liquidation plan.49 In both cases,
however, the Commissioner, despite the joint effect of sections 336
and 337, attempted to use the tax benefit rule to impose a second
tax on the liquidating subsidiary corporation.50
It is the contention of this Note that a liquidating corporation
should not be compelled by the tax benefit rule to recognize gain
on the liquidation of expensed assets in addition to the gain recog-
nized at the shareholder level unless gain is in fact realized by the
liquidating corporation and unless one of two additional condi-
tions is present: (1) the gain must be realized by the corporation
before the liquidation transaction, or (2) the gain must be a type
not protected by sections 336 and 337. Unless these requirements
are satisfied, the application of the tax benefit rule to the corporate
liquidation of expensed assets frustrates the purpose of section 336
and section 337. In order to demonstrate the validity of this con-
tention, there first must be an examination of the analyses of both
South Lake Farms and Tennessee-Carolina, an exercise to which
the following sections are devoted.
II. COMMISSIONER V. SOUTH LAKE FARMS, INC.
South Lake Farms5' was the first case which dealt directly with
the applicability of the tax benefit rule to section 336. South Lake
49. In both of these cases, the parent corporation bought the stock of the subsidiary
for the purpose of acquiring the subsidiary's assets through liquidation. Tennessee-Caro-
lina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 378, 379-80 (1978); Commissioner v. South
Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837, 839 (1963). In this type of liquidation, the purchase of
stock and subsequent liquidation qf the assets are telescoped into a single transaction--the
purchase of assets by the parent. The gain on the liquidation of the subsidiary is recog-
nized at the shareholder level by the original shareholders on the sale of their stock to the
acquiring parent corporation. Because the subsidiary owns the expensed assets, the
amount which the original shareholders may receive for their stock is increased. Therefore,
gain is recognized by the original shareholders on the transfer of the expensed assets to the
parent corporation. The parent recognizes no gain on the liquidation and takes a stepped-
up basis on the assets of the subsidiary received in liquidation. See Kimbell-Diamond
Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74 (1948), ad per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 825 (1951). The rule of Kimball-Diamond has been codified in
I.R.C. § 334(b)(2). See generally Bonovitz, Problems in Achieving Parity in Tax Treatment
Under Sections 337 and 334(b)(2), 34 N.Y.U. INST. FED. INCOME TAX. 57 (1976); Note,
Corporate Liquidations Incident to the Acquisition of Assets: A Look at Some Current
ProblemsArising From a Section 332-334(b)(2) Liquidation, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 390 (1975);
Note, Judicial Exceptions to Section 337 A Return to Court Holding?, 26 U. FLA. L. REV.
786 (1974).
50. 582 F.2d at 380; 324 F.2d at 839.
51. 36 T.C. 1027 (1961), afJ'd, 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963).
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Farms, Inc., the subsidiary,52 was a corporation engaged in the
farming business, growing principally cotton and barley.13 The
subsidiary was an accrual method taxpayeri4 with a fiscal year
ending April 30. For the fiscal year ending April 30, 1956, South
Lake Farms incurred expenses in cultivating fields and planting
crops, and it subsequently incurred additional expenses associated
with the crops between May 1, 1956 and September 29, 1956.
These expenses were properly deducted for income tax purposes
in the year incurred." The crops, however, were neither invento-
ried5 6 nor included in the gross income of the subsidiary.
South Lake Farms, the parent, was incorporated for the pur-
pose of buying the stock of the subsidiary. The parent purchased
all of the subsidiary's stock on September 29, 1956 and immedi-
ately liquidated the subsidiary and took over the subsidiary's as-
sets,57 which included the uninventoried, zero-basis crops. The
subsidiary recognized no gain on this transaction, 58 and neither
did the parent. 9 The parent's basis in the unharvested crops rep-
resented an amount in the same proportion to the parent's cost of
the subsidiary's stock as was the fair market value of the un-
harvested crops to the total fair market value of the assets received
in liquidation." In determining its taxable income for the fiscal
52. For clarity, the liquidating corporation shall be referred to as the subsidiary and
the surviving shareholder corporation as the parent.
53. 36 T.C. at 1029.
54. Id See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) (1957) and note 66 infra.
55. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-3 (1958).
56. The crops therefore had a zero basis in the hands of the subsidiary. 36 T.C. at
1032.
57. Id at 1033.
58. See I.R.C. § 336.
59. See I.R.C. § 332. Under the general rule of§ 331, amounts received from a liqui-
dating corporation by a shareholder are treated as full payment in exchange for the stock,
thus requiring the recognition of gain or loss. Section 332, however, provides for nonrecog-
nition of gain or loss by a parent liquidating a subsidiary, subject to the requirements of
§ 332(b).
60. 36 T.C. at 1033. The Code provides that:
(2) EXCEPTION.-If property is received by a corporation in a distribution in
complete liquidation of another corporation (within the meaning of section
332(b)), and if-
(A) the distribution is pursuant to a plan of liquidation adopted not more
than 2 years after the date of the transaction described in subparagraph (B) (or, in
the case of a series of transactions, the date of the last such transaction); and
(B) stock of the distributing corporation possessing at least 80 percent of the
total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote, and at least 80
percent of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock (except nonvot-
ing stock which is limited and preferred as to dividends), was acquired by the
distributee by purchase (as defined in paragraph (3)) during a 12-month period
beginning with the earlier of,
1979]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE L4W REVIEW
year ending on June 30, 1957, the parent offset this basis against
the proceeds from the sale of its crops.6 t
The cost of the crops was therefore deducted twice-once by
the subsidiary when the expenses were initially incurred and a sec-
ond time by the parent upon the receipt of the crops pursuant to
liquidation. The crops, however, produced income only for the
parent when they were harvested and sold.62 Although section
336 prohibited the recognition of gain by the subsidiary when the
crops were distributed to the parent,63 the Commissioner claimed
that the subsidiary should recognize income upon the distribution
of the expensed assets because of the aforementioned double de-
duction.64
In the Tax Court, the Commissioner made two alternative de-
ficiency assessments against the subsidiary. First, the Commis-
sioner contended that the subsidiary should have included the
value of the crops transferred to the parent in its gross income for
the year of liquidation.65 Otherwise, the Commissioner reasoned,
the subsidiary would have the tax advantage of a deduction for
the cost of producing the crops without reporting and paying tax
on the income generated by the crops. Since the subsidiary's
(i) the date of the first acquisition by purchase of such stock, or
(ii) if any of such stock was acquired in an acquisition which is a
purchase within the meaning of the second sentence of paragraph (3), the
date on which the distributee is first considered under section 318(a) as own-
ing stock owned by the corporation from which such acquisition was made,
then the basis of the property in the hands of the distributee shall be the
adjusted basis of the stock with respect to which the distribution was made.
For purposes of the preceding sentence, under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary, proper adjustment in the adjusted basis of any stock shall be made
for any distribution made to the distributee with respect to such stock before
the adoption of the plan of liquidation, for any money received, for any lia-
bilities assumed or subject to which the property was received, and for other
items.
I.R.C. § 334(b)(2).
61. 36 T.C. at 1033. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-3 (1958).
62. Actually, the crops also produced income for the original shareholders of the sub-
sidiary. The price they received from the parent corporation in exchange for their stock in
the subsidiary reflected the fair market value of the underlying assets of the subsidiary
which included the recently produced, unharvested crops. The original shareholders there-
fore recognized a gain on the sale of their stock to the parent at least to the extent that the
fair market value of the crops exceeded the cost of producing the crops. 36 T.C. at 1035,
324 F.2d at 839. See note 49 supra. Since a corporation and its shareholders are separate
taxable entities, the gains of the shareholder cannot be attributed to the corporation, as
stated by the court in South Lake Farms. 324 F.2d at 839. See note 1 supra.
63. See text accompanying notes 174-83 infra for a discussion of whether gain is actu-
ally realized on a corporate in-kind liquidation.
64. 36 T.C. at 1034; 324 F.2d at 838.
65. 36 T.C. at 1035.
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method of accounting did not clearly reflect income for its final
period of operations, the Commissioner argued that he had prop-
erly invoked the provisions of section 446(b).6 6
The court felt that, in reality, the Commissioner was asserting
the assignment of income doctrine,6 7 claiming that the income to
be earned on the unharvested crops could not be transferred to
another taxpayer under the protection of section 336 and should
be recognized by the party that incurred the costs which produced
the income.68 The Tax Court rejected this argument and held that
the value of the cotton crop should not be included in the subsidi-
ary's income. 69 The court based its conclusion upon SoRelle v.
Commissioner,70 a case in which an accrual basis taxpayer de-
ducted the cost of cultivating crops and then transferred the land
and unharvested crops to his children without recognizing gain.
In that case, the Tax Court viewed the transaction as a transfer of
property and held that the income was earned by the children
when the crops were harvested under their ownership and not by
the taxpayer prior to transfer.7 1 The court in South Lake Farms
applied the same reasoning and found that
To the time of the dissolution of the old corporation, no income
had been received by or accrued to it with respect to the cotton
crop or the land preparation .... At most, they [unharvested
crops] merely represented property being held by the old [sub-
66. Id at 1034-35. Section 446 provides in part that:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-Taxable income shall be computed under the
method of accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his
income in keeping his books.
(b) EXCEPTIONS.-If no method of accounting has been regularly used by
the taxpayer or fthe method used does not clearly reflect income, the computation
of taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the opinion of the
Secretary or his delegate, does clearly reflect income.
(c) PERMISSIBLE METHODS.-Subject to the provisions of subsections
(a) and (b), a taxpayer may compute taxable income under any of the following
methods of accounting-
(2) an accrual method-,
I.R.C. § 446 (emphasis added).
67. The courts have consistently held that a taxpayer cannot avoid the recognition of
income by assigning to another the right to receive that income. Income is taxed to the
party who earns it, not the party who receives it. E.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112
(1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). See generally B. BrIrKar & J. EusTicE, supra
note 1, 1.05, at 1-18. For a complete discussion of the assignment of income doctrine, see
Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P.G. Lake Case,
17 TAx. L. REv. 293 (1962).
68. 36 T.C. at 1037.
69. Id at 1039.
70. 22 T.C. 249 (1954).
71. Id at 478.
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sidiary] corporation for future disposition or utilization.72
In his alternative argument supporting the deficiency assess-
ment, the Commissioner claimed that the subsidiary should in-
clude an amount equal to the amount originally deducted for the
production costs of the unharvested crops in gross income on its
final return.73 In taking this position with respect to the deduc-
tions for land preparation and crop planting, the Commissioner
exercised his discretion under section 48274 to allocate deductions
between two businesses in order to prevent tax evasion and to in-
sure the clear reflection of income by those businesses. The Com-
missioner posited that by accepting the parent's basis in the crops
under section 334(b)(2),75 he had allocated to the parent a tax ben-
efit corresponding to the expense deductions for the cost of the
crops taken by the subsidiary.76 Applying section 482, the Com-
missioner concluded that he could disallow the deduction by the
subsidiary which he had permitted the parent to take in the form
of basis.77
The Tax Court also rejected the Commissioner's second the-
ory,78 observing that the Commissioner did not "allow" the parent
the deduction at all. Rather, the parent was entitled to the deduc-
tion under section 334(b)(2). Therefore, because the Commis-
sioner had not allocated the deduction to the parent in the first
place, he had no power under section 482 to disallow the deduc-
tion for the subsidiary. 79
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the Commissioner abandoned
his section 482 argument and relied solely on his section 446 as-
72. 36 T.C. at 1038.
73. Id at 1040.
74. This section provides that:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not
incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not
affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the
Secretary or his delegate may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, de-
ductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or
businesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is
necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of
any of such organizations, trades, or businesses.
I.R.C. § 482.
75. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
76. 36 T.C. at 1040.
77. Actually, the Commissioner did not disallow the deduction. Rather, he offset it by
requiring the subsidiary to include the amount of the previous deduction in its income. Id
at 1041.




signment of income theory. 0 The court of appeals also rejected
this argument. Adopting the Tax Court's reasoning that no in-
come had been earned by the subsidiary at the time of the dissolu-
tion, the court concluded that the Commissioner could not
exercise his section 446(b) powers in order to require the subsidi-
ary to include the value of the crops in its gross income.81
In essence, said the court, the Commissioner was contending
that the subsidiary had reaped a tax benefit by deducting expenses
incurred prior to liquidation.82 The Commissioner's contention
followed from the fact that the price the parent had paid the sub-
sidiary's shareholders for their stock was fixed in part upon the
fair market value of the zero-basis crops; thus, although the sub-
sidiary had received an amount equivalent to, and sufficient to
offset, the crop preparation expenses deducted, it had not included
that amount in its taxable income.8 3 But, as the Court pointed
out, the subsidiary's shareholders actually received the proceeds of
the sale and paid a tax on the gain. Since the subsidiary received
nothing, the court found that there was no recovery of the deduc-
tions and therefore no tax benefit.8 4 The court recognized the tax
windfall accruing to the original shareholders of the subsidiary85
but felt that until Congress chose to remedy the situation, the
courts could not hold otherwise.86
III. TENNESSEE-CAROLINA TRANSPORTATION, INC. V.
COMMISSIONER
The facts of Tennessee-Carolina7 are similar to those of South
Lake Farms. Service Lines, Inc., the subsidiary, was an accrual
80. 324 F.2d at 838.
81. Id at 840. As an accrual basis taxpayer, the subsidiary included income on its tax
return in the year the income was earned, not collected. Therefore, since income is gener-
ally not recognized for tax purposes any earlier than the time at which it is earned, the
subsidiary's income would not have been includable in gross income under any other
method recognized by the regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(I)(ii) (1957).
82. 324 F.2d at 839.
83. Id
84. Id
85. The result in this case is a tax windfall for the stockholders of the old corporation.
They received a price for their stock that was enhanced by their corporation's expenditures,
which were deducted from its income, thereby reducing its income tax, even though it
never paid tax on the income that the expenditures were expected to produce. Id at 840.
Furthermore, the tax paid by the original shareholders on the sale of stock was likely calcu-
lated at a capital gain rather than an ordinary income rate. See I.R.C. § 1202.
86. Id
87. 65 T.C. 440 (1975), aff'd, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1219
(1979).
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basis taxpayer engaged in the motor freight business."8 In operat-
ing its business, the subsidiary purchased tires and tubes for its
own equipment and for equipment which it leased. The cost of
the tires and tubes to be mounted on equipment was completely
expensed when the tires and tubes were placed into service. The
cost of the supplies acquired with new equipment was deducted
when the supplies were purchased. 9
Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc., the parent, pur-
chased all of the stock of the subsidiary from the subsidiary's
shareholders in order to liquidate the subsidiary and acquire its
assets. The subsidiary recognized no gain on the distribution of its
assets to the parent.90 The parent recognized no gain on the liqui-
dation,9' took a section 334(b)(2) basis in the assets,92 including
the tires and tubes, and immediately deducted it from gross in-
come as an expense.93 Again bothered by an expense deducted
twice with only one corresponding recognition of income,94 the
Commissioner argued that, irrespective of section 336, the subsidi-
ary should recognize gain on the liquidation.9
The Tax Court did not consider the section 446 assignment of
income theory offered in South Lake Farms,96 but relied solely on
the tax benefit theory dismissed by the court of appeals in South
Lake Farms.9 7 Convinced by the Commissioner's tax benefit ar-
gument, the Tax Court found that
Once Service had expensed their cost, the tires and tubes were
therefore deemed to have been fully consumed in its operations
for purposes of Federal income taxation whatever their fair
market value may have been. If, having expensed the cost of
the tires and tubes Service subsequently treated them as prop-
erty having a fair market value in a transaction of consequence
in the scheme of Federal income taxation, it would therefore
necessarily be deemed to have received tires and tubes identical
to them immediately prior to that transaction.98
88. 65 T.C. at 441.
89. Id at 442-43.
90. Id at 447. See I.R.C. § 336.
91. See I.R.C. § 332 and note 59 supra.
92. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
93. 65 T.C. at 443. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-3 (1958).
94. See note 62 supra.
95. 65 T.C. at 447.
96. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
97. 65 T.C. at 447-48. See text accompanying notes 82-84 supra.
98. 65 T.C. at 447. The Tax Court considered the Ninth Circuit's concept of "recov-
ery" within the context of the tax benefit rule in South Lake Farms to be "unduly restric-
tive." Id In South Lake Farms, the court refused to apply the tax benefit rule because the
712 [Vol. 29:700
CORPORA TE LIQUIDATIONS
The court went on to hold that this recovery by the subsidiary was
an event of independent significance prior to the liquidation and
therefore not protected by section 336.99
The court of appeals affirmed the Tax Court's decision.' 00 In
so doing, it reconstructed the transaction under section 337,101
which prohibits liquidating corporations from recognizing gain or
loss on a sale or exchange made in connection with a liquidation.
In a section 337 liquidation, the liquidating corporation actu-
ally sells the property to a third party and then distributes the cash
to its shareholders. Since such a transaction clearly satisfies the
recovery requirement of the tax benefit rule because the corpora-
tion receives economic value for the assets, courts have consist-
ently held that the tax benefit rule overrides section 337, requiring
the liquidating corporation to recognize gain on the preliquidation
sale. 10 2
The court in Tennessee-Carolina reasoned that Congress had
intended sections 336 and 337 to produce identical tax results,
whether the corporation distributed its assets in kind or sold the
assets and distributed the proceeds. 0 3 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that because the tax benefit rule supersedes section 337, it
should similarly override section 336. °4 To support this conclu-
sion, the court offered three different theories to establish that re-
covery under the tax benefit rule had, in fact, occurred.
First, the court posited that a transaction occurring subsequent
to a prior tax deduction which is inconsistent with that deduction
invokes the tax benefit rule even though there is no recovery in the
traditional sense. One such inconsistent event occurs when assets
are distributed in liquidation after having been fully deducted for
tax purposes. This inconsistency, concluded the court, requires in-
subsidiary received nothing in exchange for its assets and thus had not recovered their cost
within the traditional meaning of the tax benefit rule. 324 F.2d at 839.
99. 65 T.C. at 448.
100. 582 F.2d at 383.
101. This section provides that:
If, within the 12-month period beginning on the date on which a corporation
adopts a plan of complete liquidation, all of the assets of the corporation are
distributed in complete liquidation, less assets retained to meet claims, then no
gain or loss shall be recognized to such corporation from the sale or exchange by
it of property within such 12-month period.
I.R.C. § 337(a).
102. E.., Spitalny v. United States, 430 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1970); Commissioner v.
Anders, 414 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir. 1969). See generally Note, Judicial Exceptions to Section
337. A Return to Court Holding?, supra note 49.
103. See notes 41-46 supra and accompanying text.
104. 582 F.2d at 381.
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vocation of the tax benefit rule. t05
Second, assuming that recovery was required to apply the tax
benefit rule, the court concluded that such recovery was present
here because the tires and tubes must have been recovered in or-
der to have been distributed in liquidation. 0 6 Under this "fic-
tional recovery" argument, the court reasoned that when the
original deduction is taken by the subsidiary for the assets
purchased, the assets are immediately consumed for tax pur-
poses.' 0 7 Bothered by the inconsistency between this theoretical
consumption and the subsequent transfer of the assets, the court
concluded that assets of a like kind must have been recovered
prior to the liquidation and therefore gain should be recognized
under the tax benefit rule despite section 336. In so doing, the
court rejected the notion that there must be actual economic re-
covery in the form of the receipt of assets or cancellation of liabili-
ties. 108
Third, the court found that the actual economic recovery re-
quired by South Lake Farms'019 had been satisfied since the sub-
sidiary received the value of its stock in exchange for the assets it
had distributed."' This theory assumes that the subsidiary's
treasury stock represented economic value when it was transferred
by the parent to the subsidiary in exchange for the assets of the
subsidiary. '1'
By invoking the tax benefit rule in Tennessee-Carolina, the
Sixth Circuit forced the taxpayer to recognize gain in a transaction
which otherwise seemed protected from recognition by an express
statutory provision. Furthermore, the court seems to have ex-
panded the tax benefit rule without considering the possible
ramifications of its holding. The court of appeals in South Lake
Farms was, however, equally superficial in holding that the tax
benefit rule should not apply to section 336 liquidations. Al-
though the applicability of the tax benefit rule to corporate distri-
butions of expensed assets pursuant to liquidation is not an issue
with an obvious solution," 2 it is one that should be analyzed care-
105. Id at 382.
106. Id
107. Id
108. Id See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
109. 324 F.2d at 829. See note 98 supra.
110. 582 F.2d at 382.
111. Id
112. In South Lake Farms, one appellate judge filed a lengthy dissenting opinion. 324
F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963) (Carter, J., dissenting). In Tennessee-Carolina, seven judges on the
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fully-especially since the Sixth Circuit has favored a judicial
doctrine over a legislative mandate.
IV. THE TAX BENEFIT RULE
The term "tax benefit rule" has two distinct applications in tax
law. In one sense, it is a rule of inclusion requiring a taxpayer to
include in income the amount of a recovery which would not
otherwise be taxed under section 61 of the Code, such as a refund
of taxes previously paid." 3 In its other sense, as codified in sec-
tion 111 relating to bad debt deductions, the tax benefit rule is also
a rule of exclusion used by the taxpayer to exclude from gross
income recovery which would otherwise be taxed under section 61
but which produced no prior tax benefit when deducted."' For
example, if an asset is sold which was previously expensed in a
year when the taxpayer had no gross income to offset, the tax ben-
efit rule exempts from recognition the gain realized on the sale. t I 5
In both South Lake Farms and Tennessee-Carolina, the origi-
nal deduction of the asset produced a tax benefit; therefore, the
exclusionary function of the rule is not at issue. The question is
whether the tax benefit rule should require a liquidating corpora-
tion to include in its gross income the cost of assets distributed
upon liquidation.
The first step in analyzing the applicability of the tax benefit
rule to section 336 is to determine whether the requirements of
this judicial doctrine are satisfied by a corporate distribution of
Tax Court dissented, 65 T.C. 440 (1975) (Tannenwald, J., dissenting), and one judge lim-
ited the majority's holding in a separate concurring opinion. Id (Simpson, J., concurring).
The court of appeals decision was 2-I in favor of the Commissioner. 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir.
1978) (Weick, J., concurring and dissenting). Bittker and Eustice, in their treatise on corpo-
rate taxation, comment that much can be said for applying the tax benefit rule to corporate
liquidations, but go on to say that "the development of statutory 'recapture' devices
(§§ 1245, 1250, 1251, and 47) to deal with analogous problems may stimulate a judicial
refusal to police this area on the ground that Congress can do the job more stystemati-
cally." B. BITTKER & J. EusTicE, supra note 1, T 11-62, at 11-52. There has also been a
suggestion that the application of the tax benefit rule by the court in Tennessee-Caro-
lina-based on the happening of an inconsistent event--"may imply a more imperial cor-
rective role than the doctrine is destined to play, but it surely points in the right direction."
Bittker & Kanner, supra note 11, at 284.
113. See 1 J. MERTENS, supra note 9, §§ 7.34-37; Bittker & Kanner, supra note 11;
O'Hare, Statutory Nonrecognition of Income and the Overriding Principle of the Tax Beneft
Rule in the Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders, 27 TAX L. Rnv. 215 (1972); Note,
The Tax Benft Rule, Claim of/Right Restorations and Annual Accounting: A Curefor the
Inconsistencies, 21 VAND. L. Rav. 995, 999-1002 (1968).
114. See note 113 supra.
115. Ie
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expensed assets pursuant to a plan of complete liquidation." 16 If
the transaction does not fall within the tax benefit rule, there is no
reason to consider the imposition of a second tax at the corporate
level using a tax benefit theory. 17 In the context of corporate liq-
uidations, the issue is whether recovery has occurred. Unless re-
covery has occurred, there is no realization of gain by the
corporation under the traditional tax benefit rule and the question
of recognition under section 336 is irrelevant unless a court ex-
pands the scope of the rule." 8 The courts in South Lake Farms
and Tennessee-Carolina propounded several theories in their at-
tempt to decide whether the requisite recovery element had been
satisfied. It is important to examine each of them to determine if
they properly apply the tax benefit rule to corporate liquidations
and to determine if there is perhaps a better way to explain the tax
consequences of the distribution of expensed assets.
A. The Inconsistent Event Theory
The first theory advanced by the Sixth Circuit in Tennessee-
Carolina-that an event inconsistent with a prior deduction con-
stitutes a recovery under the tax benefit rule' 9 -directly conflicts
with the Ninth Circuit's view in South Lake Farms that economic
recovery is required to invoke the tax benefit rule. 2 ' Relying on
Estate of Block v. Commissioner 121 for support, the Tennessee- Car-
olina court concluded that, in the setting of a corporate liquida-
tion, the transfer to shareholders of an asset whose fair market
value exceeds its basis is inconsistent with prior deductions which
created the artificially low basis.'22 The theory is simply that this
116. See Morrison, Assignment of Income and Tax Benefit Principles in Corporate Liqui-
dations, 54 TAXES 902 (1976); Broener, The Tax Benfit Rule and Sections 332, 334(b)(2)
and 336, 53 TAXES 231 (1975); O'Hare, Application of Tax Benefit Rule in New Case Threat-
ens Certain Liquidations, 44 J. OF TAX. 200 (1976); O'Hare, supra note 113.
117. See text accompanying notes 45-50 supra.
118. See text accompanying notes 1-11 supra.
119. 582 F.2d at 382. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
120. 324 F.2d at 839.
121. 39 B.T.A. 338 (1939), affidsub nom. Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 11l F.2d
60 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 658 (1940). In Block, the decedent's estate paid
federal estate taxes and claimed deductions from income for those payments. The applica-
ble state inheritance tax law was subsequently amended which resulted in the estate paying
additional state taxes. This provided the estate with a larger credit for federal estate tax
purposes and the estate received a refund of federal estate tax. The court held that the
estate had to include in income the amount of estate tax recovered. Id at 342.
122. 582 F.2d at 382. The court stated that "the transfer to taxpayer [the parent] with a
stepped-up basis, pursuant to § 334(b)(2), of the tires and tubes which had a substantial
useful life remaining was inconsistent with the prior expensing of them [which reduced
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inconsistency supplants the need for any actual, physical recovery
of a tangible asset or sum in the traditional sense of the tax benefit
rule. 2 3 As pointed out, however, by the combination concurrence
and dissent, Block involved an actual economic recovery by the
taxpayer within the meaning of the tax benefit rule; therefore, the
language in Block supporting the inconsistent event theory of Ten-
nessee-Carolina was dictum.'24 The separate opinion further ob-
served that the tax benefit rule has never been applied in a case in
which there was no economic recovery.'25 The majority therefore
seems to have significantly expanded the application of the tax
benefit rule by citing a case with questionable precedential value
in support of its inconsistent event theory.
The Supreme Court entertained an argument similar to the in-
consistent event theory in a case which concerned the applicability
of the tax benefit rule to section 351, another nonrecognition pro-
vision. 26 In Nash v. United States, 27 an accrual basis partnership
transferred accounts receivable to a corporation in exchange for
its stock. Immediately after the transaction, the partners were in
control of the corporation, and the transaction therefore qualified
for nonrecognition of gain under section 351.128 The Commis-
sioner argued that because the taxpayer had taken tax deductions
through a "reserve for bad debts" account, 2 9 the taxpayer should
their basis to zero], which indicated they had been or would be totally used up by Service
[the subsidiary]. This inconsistency is enough to invoke the tax benefit rule." Id (Foot-
note omitted).
123. It is important to note that the court was not attempting to apply this argument to
excessive depreciation deductions. The recapture provisions of the Code require statutory
recovery of those excessive deductions. See note 6 supra.
124. 582 F.2d at 384 (Weick, J., concurring and dissenting).
125. Id See note II supra and accompanying text.
126. That section provides:
No gain or loss shall be recognized if property is transferred to a corporation
by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock or securities in such corpora-
tion and immediately after the exchange such person or persons are in control
* * * of the corporation.
I.R.C. § 35 1(a).
127. 398 U.S. 1 (1970). The Nash case is discussed here primarily because the separate
opinion in Tennessee-Carolina cites Nash as support for the proposition that the mere oc-
currence of an inconsistent event does not invoke the tax benefit rule. 582 F.2d at 384
(Weick, J., concurring and dissenting). The reasoning of Nash has been applied to corpo-
rate liquidations under section 337. E.g., Citizens Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 462
F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1972).
128. 391 U.S. at 3.
129. See I.R.C. § 166(c). A reserve for bad debts account reflects the taxpayer's esti-
mate of the value of accounts receivable that are uncollectible and reduces accounts receiv-
able on the balance sheet. The net book value should, therefore, reflect the fair market
value or collectibility of the receivables. The reserve account is established by debiting the
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recognize income under the tax benefit rule because the need for
those valuation deductions ended when the receivables were
transferred to the corporation. 130 The Supreme Court ruled that
merely because the need for a deduction had ended, the tax bene-
fit rule could not be triggered in order to supersede section 35 I. 131
Since the taxpayer had received securities from the corporation
with a fair market value equal to the net book value of the receiv-
ables,132 application of the tax benefit rule, with the corresponding
recognition of gain, seemed particularly inapposite. 133
It is unclear whether the Court in Nash did not tax the transfer
because gain had not been realized or because, even if gain had
been realized, section 351 prevented its recognition. Although the
Court stated that no gain or loss was recognized on the transfer, 134
its reliance on the reasoning of Estate of Schmidt v. Commis-
sioner135 indicates that the Court felt that there was no realization
of gain due to the end of the need for the deduction. 136 Schmidt
held that realization requires that the fair market value of the
stock received be greater than the net book value of the receiv-
ables transferred. 137
The separate opinion in Tennessee-Carolina maintained that
the inconsistent event theory used by the majority to invoke the
tax benefit rule was similar to the "end of the need" argument
bad debts expense account and crediting the reserve account. As an account actually be-
comes uncollectible, the reserve account is debited and accounts receivable is credited. Pe-
riodically, the taxpayer examines its receivables and adjusts the reserve account to reflect
the new estimate. These adjustments, to the extent they increase the reserve account, are
deductible. See H. SIMON, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING, 158-61 (1977).
130. 398 U.S. at 3.
131. Id But see J.E. Hawes Corp. v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 705 (1965) a case in which
the mere end of the need for deduction for reserve for bad debts triggered recognition of
gain in a liquidation sale of the receivables for an amount less than face value.
132. The net book value of the receivables is the face amount of the receivables less the
reserve for bad debts. Because the net book value and the fair market value of the securi-
ties were equivalent, the taxpayer had not taken excess bad debt deductions. 398 U.S. at 2.
133. Id at 3.
134. Id at 5.
135. 355 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1966) (holding that, although the need for the reserve ended
when the assets were transferred, the end of that need did not represent a recovery within
the tax benefit rule since the stockholder received securities equal to the net book value of
the receivables. Id at 113).
136. O'Hare, supra note 113, at 220-21.
137. 355 F.2d at 114. This statement by the court in Schmidt may imply that the trans-
feror may be forced, by virtue of § 1001, to recognize income from the transfer of receiv-
ables with a net book value less than the fair market value of the stock received, and then
increase, under § 358(a)(1)(B)(ii), its basis in the stock received by the amount of income
recognized. See Rev. Rul. 78-280, 1978-30 I.R.B. 7.
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rejected in Nash."'38 The argument runs that under Nash, the fact
that the taxpayer had reduced its basis in an asset transferred to a
corporation under section 351 did not invoke the tax benefit rule;
therefore, the liquidation of an expensed asset with a basis less
than its fair market value should likewise not invoke the tax bene-
fit rule.' 39
The majority had, however, distinguished Nash, pointing out
that "unlike the instant case, in Nash the taxpayers did not trans-
fer an item (or any portion thereof) which had been the subject of
a prior deduction, but rather transferred only what was left after
the deduction."' 40 The majority in Tennessee-Carolina claimed
that the tax benefit rule was not applied in Nash because the fair
market value of the asset transferred by the taxpayer was equal to
that asset's basis, which in turn reflected properly deducted adjust-
ments. This seems to indicate that the majority felt Tennessee-
Carolina was different because the fair market value of the tires
and tubes transferred was in excess of the zero basis of those ex-
pensed assets.' 4 1 Thus, the Tennessee-Carolina subsidiary trans-
ferred a deduction, whereas in Nash, the taxpayer transferred an
asset. The court in Tennessee-Carolina did not, however, make
this distinction explicitly. Rather, it characterized Nash as simply
an exchange with no realization of gain because the fair market
value of the securities received was equal to the basis in the asset
transferred. 42 In Tennessee-Carolina, the fair market value of the
assets was in excess of the basis. Therefore, the claim by the sepa-
rate opinion that Nash on its facts proscribes the inconsistent
event theory is unwarranted.
Nash could be profitably compared with Tennessee-Carolina
only if the deductions taken by the taxpayer in Nash for bad debt
reserves were in excess of the amount needed to reflect the fair
138. 582 F.2d at 384 (Weick, J., concurring and dissenting).
139. Id
140. 582 F.2d at 383.
141. Further, in Nash, the former partners owned the transferee corporation, which
had a basis in the receivables approximately equal to the net book value or partnership
basis in the receivables. See Rev. Rul. 78-280, supra note 137. Conversely, in Tennessee-
Carolina, the shareholders of the subsidiary gave up all ownership in the asset. Therefore,
the Commissioner could still indirectly tax the partners in Nash on any gain realized on the
transfer of the receivables. This was not true in Tennessee-Carolina, since the subsidiary
had relinquished ownership of the assets upon liquidation. See I J. MERTENS, supra note
9, § 5.07. Note that this distinction assumes that gain was realized either on the transfer or
the liquidation-an assumption unlikely in Nash and at issue in Tennessee-Carolina. See
text accompanying notes 126-37 supra.
142. 582 F.2d at 383. See I.R.C. § 1001.
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market value of the receivables. 43 In that case, gain would be
realized by the taxpayer,"' and the only question would be
whether the gain should be recognized or whether section 351
should control. 4 5 This conclusion would not hold true for the
taxpayer in Tennessee- Carolina because the taxpayer in the Nash
hypothetical would actually have received an amount in excess of
the receivables transferred and thereby realized an economic ben-
efit. In Tennessee-Carolina, because the subsidiary received noth-
ing of value from the shareholders,"' gain could not possibly be
realized.
In summary, there are two requirements which must be satis-
fied for recognition of gain under the traditional tax benefit rule
on the transfer of expensed assets, despite a nonrecognition provi-
sion. First, the fair market value of the asset transferred by the
taxpayer must be in excess of the basis of the asset transferred.
That requirement is not satisfied in Nash but is satisfied in Tennes-
143. Similarly, in Tennessee-Carolina, the deductions for the assets purchased reduced
the basis of the assets to zero-an amount below fair market value. 582 F.2d at 380. A
requirement that the taxpayer recognize gain on the transfer of accounts receivable in a §
351 transaction with a fair market value in excess of net book value is proper under the tax
benefit rule since the taxpayer receives economic value in the form of stock of the trans-
feree corporation. Furthermore, if such a transaction were not taxed, the income which
had been sheltered by the excess deduction would be transferred to the corporation, despite
the fact that the taxpayer had earned the income and had a contractual right to receive it.
In this sense, Nash may be characterized as an assignment of income case. See notes 7 &
67 supra.
144. See note 137 supra.
145. Cf. Citizens Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 462 F.2d 1147 (3d Cir. 1972) (dis-
cussing the recovery of a bad debt reserve in the context of section 337). The gain would be
the difference between the fair market value of the securities received and the basis of the
receivables which does not reflect fair market value due to the excess reserve deductions.
146. The court of appeals in Tennessee-Carolina presented two theories to support its
conclusion that the subsidiary actually received something of value from the parent. First,
it stated that the stock the subsidiary received from its shareholders had value even though
the stock itself was completely retired. 582 F.2d at 382. See text accompanying notes
174-83 infra. The court, however, did not rely on this statement as support for its inconsis-
tent event theory. Second, the court maintained that the § 334(b)(2) stepped-up basis taken
by the parent in the subsidiary's assets received upon liquidation constituted a statutory
purchase of the subsidiary's assets by the parent. See note 49 supra. The court refers to the
§ 334(b)(2) analysis by way of footnote. It does not appear, however, that the court in-
tended the inconsistent event theory to depend upon the liquidating corporation receiving
economic value.
There is much merit to the argument that when the parent takes a basis under
§ 334(b)(2), the subsidiary has in effect sold the assets to the parent; therefore, the transac-
tion falls under § 337. See text accompanying notes 184-87 infra. If this is the case, the
court need not offer an elaborate inconsistent event theory but may simply use the accepted
doctrine that the tax benefit rule overrides § 337. See note 102 supra and accompanying
text. For a discussion of whether the tax benefit rule should override § 337, see note 187
and text accompanying notes 196-98, infra.
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see-Carolina. The majority in Tennessee-Carolina would stop the
analysis at this point and conclude that the disparity between the
distributed asset's fair market value and basis invokes the tax ben-
efit rule. But there is a second prerequisite for application of the
tax benefit rule, one implied from Nash's use of Schmidt. It is that
the difference between the fair market value of the asset and its
basis must also be realized-the taxpayer must receive something
with an economic value greater than the basis of the asset trans-
ferred. In Tennessee-Carolina, however, economic recovery is not
critical to the inconsistent event theory.147 Therefore, the court
applied the tax benefit rule under its newly-developed inconsistent
event theory in direct contradiction to a previous circuit court case
without citing supporting case law or considering the implications
of Nash. An inconsistent event or reduction of basis to an amount
below fair market value should not be enough. It should be cou-
pled with economic realization to satisfy the recovery requirement
of the tax benefit rule.
B. The Fictional Recovery Theory
The inconsistent event theory does not satisfy the requirements
of the tax benefit rule for lack of recovery. The court in Tennessee-
Carolina claimed, however, that its fictional recovery theory pro-
vided the mandatory recovery. 148 The court reasoned that since
the subsidiary had completely deducted the assets, 149 the tax law
presumes that the assets have been completely consumed. When
these consumed assets are transferred to shareholders on liquida-
tion, the tax law further presumes that immediately prior to liqui-
dation 5 ° the subsidiary fictitiously recovered the assets which
were previously deducted.' 5 ' Since the recovery occurred before
the liquidation, the income was realized before the liquidation
and was therefore not protected by the safe harbor of section
336.152 If the recovery had occurred during liquidation, to invoke
147. See note 146 supra.
148. 582 F.2d at 382. This fictional recovery theory was also posited by the Tax Court
in Tennessee-Carolina. 65 T.C. at 447-48.
149. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-3 (1958).
150. The court of appeals states that this fictional recovery occurred before the liquida-
tion. It observed that "in order for [the subsidiary] to be able to transfer [the assets] to [the
parent] they must be deemed to have been recovered by [the subsidiary] at that time, as the
Tax Court held." 582 F.2d at 382 (emphasis supplied).
151. 582 F.2d at 382.
152. The court of appeals in South Lake Farms did not consider this particular preli-
quidation gain theory but did consider the gain accruing to the original shareholders on
liquidation. 324 F.2d at 839.
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the tax benefit rule the Commissioner would have to have argued
that the gain from the recovery was a type of gain recognized de-
spite section 336 rather than a gain which occurred prior to liqui-
dation. 153
This conclusion is supported by the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Spitalny v. United States.t 54 In Spitalny, the court admitted that
the gain on the sale of the assets was protected by section 337,155
but it nonetheless held that gain must be recognized under the tax
benefit rule if expensed assets are sold pursuant to a plan of liqui-
dation. The court reasoned that:
The assignment of a zero basis to expensed items is not in re-
sponse to adjustments in valuation. It amounts, rather, to a
present fictional conversion of that "property" into a consumed
item of expense. If the feed and supplies are to revert to "prop-
erty" [to be sold under the protection of section 337] they
should be reconverted. They should not at the same time be
property [for purposes of section 337] and still retain attributes
of a fictional nonentity.1
56
In Spitalny, the recovery of the asset occurred immediately
before the section 337 sale. The Tennessee-Carolina court claimed
that in a section 336 liquidation, the assets are recovered immedi-
ately before they are transferred to the shareholders. In either
case, the fictional recovery or reconversion of the asset is not pro-
tected by the nonrecognition provisions because it occurred imme-
diately prior to the liquidating transaction.
There may, however, be analytical problems lurking beneath
the fictional recovery theory used in Spitalny and Tennessee-Caro-
lina to invoke the tax benefit rule to compel recognition of gain
prior to liquidation. The fictional recovery theory does not re-
quire, as does the tax benefit rule, 5 7 that the corporation receive
153. Cf Commissioner v. Anders, 414 F.2d 1283, 1288 (10th Cir. 1969) (holding that
the gain from the sale of an expensed asset was not realization of that asset's appreciated
value-thus shielded by § 337-but merely the unshielded recoupment of a deduction). In
Anders, the gain on the sale was taxed not because it occurred prior to the sale (therefore
outside the protection of § 337) but because it was the type of gain not protected by § 337.
See note 165 infra.
154. 430 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1970).
155. Id at 197. Only "property" as defined in § 337(b) is protected from recognition of
gain under § 337(a).
156. Id at 198. The court in Spita/ny agreed that the assets sold were property within
the meaning of § 337(b), but felt that their reconversion from a deduction into "property"
resulted in a taxable gain under the tax benefit rule before the nontaxable sale of the prop-
erty. Cf., Commissioner v. Anders, 414 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir. 1969) and S.E. Evans, Inc. v.
United States, 317 F. Supp. 423 (W.D. Ark. 1970) (both cases holding that the gain realized
on the sale was not protected by § 337). See text accompanying note 153 supra.
157. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
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value when the asset is recovered.' 58 Rather, the "recovery" re-
suits from the fact that the asset was not consumed, a fact which is
not determined until the asset is actually distributed. It thus
seems that Spitalny and Tennessee-Carolina both assert that the
assumption that the asset would be consumed because it was de-
ducted is proven to be invalid when the asset is later distributed in
liquidation.'59 The taxpayer must therefore recognize income to
the extent of the false deduction.
Carried to its logical conclusion, the fictional recovery theory
requires a taxpayer to recognize income under the tax benefit rule
any time the existence of an expensed asset is revealed by the
transfer of that asset, even though the transfer is not a sale or ex-
change. Thus, a bona fide gift of an expensed asset should give
rise to taxable income to the donor under the fictional recovery
theory because the giving of the gift indicates that the asset was
not consumed. Likewise, when a subsidiary is liquidated under
section 336, if the parent takes a section 334(b)(1)1 61 carryover ba-
sis of zero in the expensed assets rather than a section 334(b)(2)
stepped-up basis, the fictional recovery theory would require the
subsidiary to recognize income due to the mere distribution of the
asset on liquidation. This would be the case even though a carry-
158. In a § 337 liquidation, the corporation receives value from the sale of the already
recovered asset but not from the fictional recovery process itself.
159. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-3 allows the taxpayer to deduct the cost of supplies when they
are purchased, not consumed, if this procedure clearly reflects income. If there are many
unconsumed expensed assets due to an excessive deduction under the second part of that
regulation, the original deductions are clearly improper. This analysis of the fictional re-
covery theory assumes, however, that the original deductions were proper under Treas.
Reg. § 1.162-3 (1955).
160. This section provides that:
In General.-If property is received by a corporation in a distribution in com-
plete liquidation of another corporation (within the meaning of section 332(b)),
then except as provided in paragraph (2), the basis of the property in the hands of
the distributee shall be the same as it would be in the hands of the transferor. If
property is received by a corporation in a transfer to which section 332(c) applies,
and if paragraph (2) of this subsection does not apply, then the basis of the prop-
erty in the hands of the transferee shall be the same as it would be in the hands of
the transferor.
I.R.C. § 334(b)(1).
On the other hand, if a court required the subsidiary to recognize gain on liquidation,
the subsidiary might be allowed to step-up the zero basis in the expensed asset to reflect the
amount included in income under the tax benefit rule. See I.R.C. § 1012. The carryover
basis provision of § 334(b)(1) would then give the parent a stepped-up basis in the asset
which could be deducted under Treas. Reg. § 1.162-3. There are, however, no cases deal-
ing with the applicability of the tax benefit rule to § 336 and § 334(b)(1) liquidations to
support this theory.
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over basis of zero precludes the possibility of a second deduction
of the assets by the parent.
It is not clear whether the court of appeals in Tennessee-Caro-
ina intended the tax benefit rule to apply to section 334(b)(1) liq-
uidations, yet to limit the fictional recovery theory to section
334(b)(2) would destroy its logic. t6 ' Such a limitation would have
the application of the fictional recovery theory depend upon the
basis provision selected by the parent, not on the existence of the
expensed asset for distribution.
The tax benefit rule has traditionally required that the tax-
payer realize economic gain from the recovery of a deduction.
The fact that an expensed asset has not been consumed has not
met this requirement in the past.' 62 Further, the benefit accruing
to the parent's shareholders (who have received a stepped-up basis
in the asset which is then immediately deducted) cannot be im-
puted to the corporation under a tax benefit theory. The fictional
recovery of the asset at the time of liquidation, therefore, should
not invoke the tax benefit rule-because irrespective of section
336, when expensed assets are distributed, no gain is realized prior
to liquidation.
Instead of analyzing the deduction of the asset and the corpo-
ration's failure to consume it, the courts should evaluate the trans-
action at the time of the original deduction. If the asset was
deducted in the belief that the asset would be consumed within
one year 63 and not with the intent to avoid taxes, the noncon-
sumption of that asset as evidenced by its distribution in liquida-
161. The concurring opinion in the Tax Court in Tennessee-Carolina noted that the tax
benefit rule was applied because of the applicability of § 334(b)(2) to the case. Since the
parent's earlier purchase of the subsidiary's stock is viewed as a purchase of its assets, the
parent could take a stepped-up basis in the distributed assets. 65 T.C. at 449 (Simpson, J.,
concurring). See note 49 supra.
If the application of the tax benefit rule in § 336 liquidations is limited to § 334(b)(2)
basis cases, the outcome of Tennessee-Carolina can be best justified by paralleling the
transaction to a § 337 liquidation in which the tax benefit rule clearly applies. The
elaborate fictional recovery theory discussed above unnecessarily expands the tax benefit
rule. See text accompanying notes 185-86 infra.
When shareholders receive a stepped-up fair market value basis under § 334(a), the
Commissioner may also attempt to invoke the tax benefit rule. The same problems would
apply with equal force. However, the Commissioner could not rely on the § 334(b)(2) stat-
utory purchase of assets argument. See note 146 supra. Rather, the Commissioner would
have to argue that § 336 and § 337 liquidations should produce consistent results. See text
accompanying notes 193-98 infra.
162. See note I I supra and accompanying text.
163. See note 159 supra.
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tion should not invoke the tax benefit rule164  unless the
corporation received value in exchange for the asset. 165
The fictional recovery theory requires the corporation to re-
cover deductions which have reduced an asset's basis below fair
market value, even though the corporation has not received any
property of value in exchange for the assets distributed. Similarly,
section 1245 requires the taxpayer to recognize, as ordinary in-
come, that portion of the gain realized on a sale, exchange, or
other disposition which can be attributed to excessive depreciation
deductions. 66 This statutory recapture provision applies to the
164. Bittker and Eustice, in their treatise on corporate taxation, make the following
comment on judicial disallowance of corporate deductions:
[Tihe decision in Fribourg Nay. Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272, 17
AFTR 2d 470 (1966), allowing depreciation to be deducted in the year property
was sold for more than its adjusted basis indicates that the Supreme Court is not
very sympathetic to judicial or administrative disallowance of an item that
seemed deductible on the facts as known when the expense was incurred.
B. BITTKER & J. EusTIca, supra note 1, 111.62, at 11-52.
165. In a § 336 liquidation, the liquidating corporation realizes economic value only
when the shareholder takes a basis in the assets received under § 334(b)(2) because in that
case, the transaction is identical to a § 337 sale of expensed assets to which the tax benefit
rule applies. See notes 146 & 161 supra. If the corporation receives value for its assets
instead of distributing the assets to the stockholders in exchange for its stock to be retired,
the liquidation must be a § 337 sale or exchange of assets. Under § 337, a gain is realized
on the sale of the assets which invokes the tax benefit rule. See notes 153 & 156 supra and
accompanying text. Normally, the gain on the sale of corporate assets pursuant to liquida-
tion is not recognized unless the assets sold are not the type protected by § 337. See Mid-
land-Ross Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1973). Although Treas. Reg.
§ 1.337-3(a) includes all corporate assets in its definition of property, it may be that a gain
realized on the sale or exchange of an asset which was immediately expensed in the course
of business is not the type of gain protected by § 337, therefore permitting the recognition
of gain under the tax benefit rule. Rather, it may represent gain due to an excessive deduc-
tion which has offset ordinary income and not a gain resulting from appreciation in value
and the passage of time. See note 153 and accompanying text and text accompanying note
198 supra. However, the Service has agreed with the Tax Court and has treated all corpo-
rate assets as property for purposes of § 337 unless specifically excluded by § 337(b)(1).
See Stewart Trust v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 682 (1975); Rev. Rul. 77-190, 1977-1 C.B. 88.
The Commissioner may tax the liquidating corporation on the § 336 distribution under
the assignment of income doctrine, claiming that the corporation did not distribute prop-
erty to its shareholders but instead distributed a right to receive income to be generated by
that property. See notes 7 and 67 supra. Thus, the Commissioner may avoid the issue of
whether recovery has occurred. With regard to the distribution of expensed assets, the
Commissioner would argue that the deduction of the cost of an asset presumes that the
asset will generate income. The transfer of that deduction to a shareholder should not
allow the corporation to shift recognition of that income to the shareholder as well. This
argument seems especially appropriate in South Lake Farms since the corporation trans-
ferred crops to the shareholder only days before the crops were harvested. The potential
income associated with the tires and tubes in Tennessee-Carolina, however, may have been
too speculative to warrant the application of the assignment of income doctrine.
166. I.R.C. § 1245. The discussion of statutory recapture will hereinafter refer only to
§ 1245.
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distribution of depreciated property to shareholders even if the
corporation has not received any property in exchange for the liq-
uidating distribution.' 67 In such a case, the amount of recaptured
depreciation equals the excess of the fair market value of the
property over its adjusted basis. 168
The depreciation recapture provision performs a function
identical to the fictional recovery theory but does not include the
recapture of deductions for expensed assets. Since Congress has
enacted a recovery provision but has not included section 162 ex-
pensed asset deductions, it is not clear whether judicial resort to
the fictional recovery theory is appropriate.
169
The recapture provisions began to appear in the Code in
1962. t1 ° Prior to that time, without statutory authority to do so,
no cases had required a liquidating corporation to recover depre-
ciation deductions which had reduced the basis of a distributed
asset below the fair market value of the asset.' 7 ' With the advent
of section 1245, the recognition of such gain in corporate liquida-
tions was mandated.
167. § 1245(a)(1)(B)(ii). See generally Gardner, The Impact off§ 1245 & 1250 on Cor-
porate Liquidations, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 58 (1964).
168. § 1245(a)(l)(B)(ii).
169. Legislation was proposed to extend the recapture provisions of § 1245 to
purchased property which was depreciable, but which had been expensed rather than capi-
talized. H.R. 10936, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975). The Senate Finance Committee passed
the bill, but it was never considered by the entire Senate. The bill read: "For purposes of
this section, if the purchase price of property acquired after December 31, 1961, was de-
ducted as an expense and the deduction was not disallowed, the amount so allowed as a
deduction should be treated as allowed for depreciation."
170. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 13(a), 76 Stat. 1032 (1962) (codified at
I.R.C. § 1245); Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 23 1(a), 76 Stat. 1032 (1962)
(codified at I.R.C. § 1245); Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 23 1(a), 78 Stat. 100
(1964) (codified at I.R.C. § 1245).
171. In West Seattle Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1961), the court
distinguished excessive bad debt deductions, which it claimed must be recovered in a § 337
liquidation, from depreciation deductions which the court claimed need not be recovered:
A depreciation or depletion reserve is founded not upon the expectation of loss
but upon facts. It recognizes that through depletion, wear and tear or obsoles-
cence the asset has to a certain extent actually been used up and that what is
recovered by sale is recovered only from the unused portion of the asset. It recog-
nizes that to the extent that the asset has been used up the owner has already
realized or spent the asset's value and thus his remaining investment is limited to
the unrealized portion. The adjustment reflects the extent to which the asset has
actually been exhausted by depletion, wear and tear or obsolescence. The ques-
tion is whether a gain or loss has been realized on that which remains.
Id at 49. Financial accounting regards depreciation deductions primarily as a matching of
revenue and expenses, not as a valuation technique. At least from a financial accounting
standpoint, depreciation deductions serve the same matching function as do other deduc-
tions. See American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Accounting Terminology
Bulletins, No. 1, Review and Resume, par. 56 (1961).
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It should not be concluded that the codification of depreciation
recapture without including the recovery of nondepreciable ex-
pensed assets prohibits the courts from applying the tax benefit
rule as it existed before 1962.172 Perhaps the drafters of section
1245 believed that the tax benefit rule was so well established that
it was unnecessary to include expensed assets in the recapture sec-
tion in order to tax recovered expensed assets. However, Tennes-
see-Carolina's fictional recovery theory has expanded the scope of
the original tax benefit rule by not requiring that traditional eco-
nomic recovery be shown. Such an expansion of the definition of
recovery is questionable since Congress has already provided for
depreciation recapture, without including the fictional recovery of
expensed assets, when an asset is transferred with no resulting eco-
nomic gain. 173
C. The Treasury Stock Theory
Neither the inconsistent event theory nor the fictional recovery
theory satisfies the recovery requirement of the tax benefit rule
because the liquidating corporation does not realize economic
gain. The court of appeals in Tennessee-Carolina, which argued
that actual economic recovery is not required to invoke the tax
benefit rule, claimed alternatively that economic recovery does oc-
cur when a corporation liquidates under section 336, and that the
liquidating corporation's receipt of its own stock for retirement
immediately after liquidation constitutes that economic recov-
ery. 174
Section 336 provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized on
the distribution of property upon complete liquidation. A nonrec-
ognition provision serves no purpose unless gain is realized on the
transaction. Perhaps that is why the court in Tennessee-Carolina
contended that a corporation's receipt of its stock in exchange for
172. For a pre-1962 definition of the tax benefit rule, see Estate of Block v. Commis-
sioner, 39 B.T.A. 338 (1939), aj'dsub nor. Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 60
(7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 658 (1940).
The Commissioner could tax the sale or exchange of an expensed asset without the tax
benefit rule under § 1001 if the taxpayer received economic value for the asset.
173. Section 1245 requires recapture in sales and exchanges when gain is realized.
I.R.C. § 1245(a)(l)(B)(i). However, § 1245(a)(1)(B)(ii) also requires recapture in other dis-
positions in which there is no sale or exchange and therefore no amount realized. See S.
REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 96, reprintedin [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
3304, 3402. This recapture provision, therefore, expands the traditional tax benefit rule, yet
Congress did not include expensed assets in this expanded coverage.
174. 582 F.2d at 382.
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assets distributed in liquidation represents economic realization of
gain. 175
It is possible, of course, that a corporation realizes no gain at
liquidation and that section 336 merely codifies the obvious-that
there can be no recognition on liquidation because there is no re-
alization. The history of section 336 supports the latter interpreta-
tion. 176  The pre-1954 equivalent of section 336 prohibited
recognition of gain or loss on corporate liquidations. 77 It was,
however, only a regulation. Since tax regulations only interpret
the law, absent statutory authorization, the regulation could not
have prohibited recognition which was actually realized. Even
before 1939, the courts applied the rule of section 336 to corporate
liquidations and held that there should be no recognition of gain
when no gain has been realized.'7  Thus, given the history of the
nonrecognition rule, it seems that section 336 is a codification of
established law rather than a provision which prohibits recogni-
tion of realized gain or loss.
The present statutory scheme supports this conclusion. First,
section 336 refers to the distribution of property in liquidation.
The realization of gain or loss is usually associated with a sale or
exchange-not a distribution.'79 Second, section 1245 differenti-
ates between sales and exchanges and dispositions of property.'
In a sale or exchange, the gain or loss recognized is measured by
the difference between adjusted basis and amount realized. In a
disposition such as a corporate liquidation, however, there is no
sale or exchange. Thus, the unrealized appreciation in value must
be measured by the difference between the fair market value of
the asset and its adjusted basis.' 8 1
175. Id
176. See text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
177. See Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-20, Internal Revenue Code of 1939; S. REP. No.
1622, supra note 41 at 258.
178. In Stock Yards Bank of Cincinnati v. Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 964 (1932) the
court stated that "[n]o gain or loss is realized by a corporation from the mere distribution of
its assets in kind upon dissolution, however they may have appreciated or depreciated in
value since their acquisition." Id at 970, quoting from Treas. Reg. 69, Art. 548 (emphasis
supplied).
179. See I.R.C. § 1001. Section 337 prohibits recognition on a sale or exchange of
property pursuant to a plan of liquidation. Gain is clearly realized under section 337.
Section 336 prohibits recognition on a disposition of property. The court in Tennessee-
Carolina cites § 33 1(a) to show that a corporate liquidation is a sale or exchange. 582 F.2d
at 382. That conclusion is true from the standpoint of the shareholder, but not of the
liquidating corporation.
180. I.R.C. § 1245(a)(l)(B)(i), (ii).
181. See S. REP. No. 1881, supra note 173, at 96.
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A similar conclusion is reached if an economic or financial
analysis is applied to the transaction. Stock represents the inves-
tor's claim to ownership in the assets of the corporation. There-
fore, the stock of the liquidating corporation has value only until
it is transferred back to the corporation by the shareholders. Since
the balance sheet of the liquidating corporation immediately after
the liquidation' would show no assets but only the capital stock
account offset by a contra capital account of treasury stock which
would have no marketability, the receipt of this valueless treasury
stock by the liquidating corporation does not give rise to economic
realization. Therefore, the recovery requirement of the tax benefit
rule is not satisfied.
Even if gain were realized on liquidation due to the corpora-
tion's receipt of its stock, it might not be recognized because of
section 336. Unlike the fictional recovery theory where gain is
deemed to be realized before the liquidation and therefore not
protected by the statute, this gain would result from the liquida-
tion ttansaction to which section 336 is specifically directed. The
Commissioner would therefore be compelled to argue that the
gain realized was not the type protected by section 336.183
V. THE LIMITED APPLICATION OF THE TAx BENEFIT RULE
Tennessee-Carolina held that the tax benefit rule should apply
to corporate liquidations in order to force the liquidating corpora-
tion to recognize income when expensed assets are distributed in
kind to shareholders. 84 This Note has argued, however, that the
tax benefit rule requirement of recovery is not always satisfied in a
section 336 liquidation, at least not to the extent indicated in Ten-
nessee-Carolina.
There is a strong argument that the tax benefit rule should ap-
ply when the parent corporation takes a stepped-up basis under
section 334(b)(2) in the assets received from the subsidiary. When
the parent buys the stock of the subsidiary with the purpose of
acquiring the subsidiary's assets, the transaction may be tele-
182. The court in Tennessee-Carolina distinguishes between the value of stock after the
liquidation and at the time of the liquidation. 582 F.2d 382. It seems that the real distinc-
tion regarding the stock relates to the value of the stock either before or after the liquida-
tion. Before the liquidation, although the stock has value, the liquidating corporation has
not yet received it. After the liquidation, the corporation has received the treasury stock
but it has no value.
183. See note 153 and accompanying text and note 165 supra.
184. 582 F.2d at 379.
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scoped into a statutory sale of the subsidiary's assets to the parent
under section 337.185 Since there is economic realization of gain
in a section 337 sale, the tax benefit rule is satisfied.'8 6 This is the
situation in both Tennessee-Carolina and South Lake Farms.
Therefore, on its facts, the Tennessee- Carolina decision is cor-
rect-assuming, of course, that the tax benefit rule should apply to
section 337 cases.1 87
The court in Tennessee-Carolina, however, does not limit its
holding to section 334(b)(2) cases, which perhaps implies that the
tax benefit rule is applicable to all section 336 liquidations. It is
doubtful, however, that the Commissioner would attempt to apply
the tax benefit rule to situations in which the parent-shareholder
takes a carryover basis 88 of zero in the expensed assets received
pursuant to liquidation. To do so would deny both the subsidiary
and the parent the deduction. If the tax benefit rule is not applied
to section 334(b)(1) liquidations, there is still but one deduction of
expensed assets by the subsidiary when the assets are purchased.
Nevertheless, a strict reading of Tennessee- Carolina suggests that
the Sixth Circuit would not be sympathetic toward this argument.
When a corporation distributes its assets to noncorporate
shareholders or to noncontrolling corporate shareholders, those
shareholders take a fair market value in the assets under section
334(a). The basis effect of section 334(a) is the same as section
334(b)(2)-a step-up for the shareholder to fair market value. 89
In a practical sense, however, a section 334(a) liquidation may
yield a different result. Because no controlling parent corporation
takes the assets, the assets may not be transferred together as a
continuation of the original firm in a different business form but
are frequently split up. Therefore, many of the shareholders may
not have a valid business purpose for deducting the fair market
value of the assets in liquidation-a possibility which eliminates
185. See note 49 supra.
186. See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
187. See note 198 infra. It may be argued that to apply the tax benefit rule to § 337
liquidations, as in § 336 liquidations, the recovery must occur before the § 337 transaction
or the property sold must be a type not protected by § 337. The first argument depends
upon the validity of the fictional recovery theory. See text accompanying notes 147-73
supra. These arguments notwithstanding, the mere fact that a corporation receives eco-
nomic value in a § 337 sale has led to the well-established conclusion that the tax benefit
rule overrides § 337. See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
188. See I.R.C. § 334(b)(1).
189. The parent's § 334(b)(2) basis in the assets received from the subsidiary will be
equal to the fair market value of the assets assuming that the price of the stock purchased
was equal to the fair market value of the underlying assets.
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the problem of double deductions. Further, it is likely that few, if
any, of the shareholders in a section 334(a) liquidation originally
bought their stock in the corporation with the idea of acquiring
corporate assets on liquidation. It is therefore harder to argue that
a section 334(a) liquidation is in reality a section 337 sale of ex-
pensed assets which invokes the tax benefit rule.
If, however, courts do not apply the tax benefit rule to section
334(a) liquidations, shareholders could structure their liquidation
to avoid the tax benefit rule. A corporate shareholder eligible for
a section 334(b)(1) carryover basis could forfeit some control in
the subsidiary about to be liquidated (a subsidiary which owns a
significant amount of expensed assets) in order to avail itself of the
stepped-up basis of section 334(a) and still avoid application of
the tax benefit rule. Furthermore, instead of liquidating a subsidi-
ary under section 334(b)(2), a parent could purposely opt to dis-
qualify under section 334(b)(2),9 ° take a stepped-up basis under
section 334(a), and escape the burden of the tax benefit rule. If the
corporation were owned by noncorporate shareholders, they could
liquidate the corporation, receive the expensed assets, and con-
tinue to operate the business as a sole proprietorship or partner-
ship thereby avoiding the tax benefit rule. In each situation, the
individuals or corporations who continue to operate the business
of the liquidated corporation could take a deduction for the ex-
pensed assets received in liquidation. This highlights the impor-
tance of a court analyzing any section 334(a) liquidation to
determine whether inclusion in income by the liquidating corpo-
ration of the cost of the expensed assets which are distributed in
liquidation is appropriate to offset a second tax deduction-not
because the requirements of the tax benefit rule have been satis-
fied, but rather to ensure a strict matching of revenues and ex-
penses for tax purposes.
If the facts of a specific section 334(a) liquidation indicate that
the liquidating corporation and its corporate or noncorporate
shareholders will take a deduction for the expensed asset with
only the shareholder recognizing the income associated with the
deduction, it then may be appropriate for the court to require the
liquidating corporation to include in income under section 446 or
section 482 the cost of the asset distributed in liquidation despite
section 336. This argument is posited in the dissenting opinion of
190. A corporation may avoid the results of § 334(b)(2) by waiting for more than two
years to liquidate the subsidiary. See I.R.C. § 334(b)(2)(A).
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the Court of Appeals in South Lake Farms.' The dissent points
out that the Commissioner may invoke these provisions to ensure
that there is a clear reflection of income, i:e., a matching of reve-
nues and expenses.' 92 Where recognition of income by the liqui-
dating corporation is appropriate, by relying on the Code
provisions requiring the taxpayer to obey the traditional matching
concepts of financial accounting, courts may avoid a strained ap-
plication of the tax benefit rule where there is no economic recov-
ery. Moreover, sections 446 and 482 provide the court with
statutory authority to override section 336 rather than resorting to
judicial doctrine with questionable applicability.
There is an argumentfor requiring the liquidating corporation
to recognize income in every section 334(a) liquidation. Since the
tax benefit rule applies to section 337 liquidations, 193 and since the
purpose of enacting sections 336 and 337 was to eliminate the for-
malistic distinctions between liquidations in-kind and liquidations
by sale of assets, 194 a fortiori, the tax benefit rule should apply to
section 336 liquidations. Otherwise, corporations would choose
their liquidation techniques based upon tax consequences-a re-
sult the drafters of sections 336 and 337 sought to avoid.9 5
On the other hand, since the rule codified in section 336 was a
part of the tax law long before section 337 was enacted, 196 perhaps
section 337 should produce an outcome similar to that which re-
sults when the applicability of the tax benefit rule is considered in
section 336 cases without the influence of section 337 cases.' 97 At
the very least, it could be argued that the applicability of the tax
benefit rule to section 336 should not be controlled by previously
191. Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837, 849-50 (9th Cir. 1963)
(Carter, J., dissenting). The majority opinion in Tennessee-Carolina also alluded to this
argument by claiming that "the tax benefit rule should be applied flexibly in order to
counteract the inflexibility of the annual accounting concept which is necessary for admin-
istration of the tax laws." Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d
378, 382 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 99 S. Ct. 1219 (1979). The dissenting opinion in South
Lake Farms also discusses the application of the tax benefit rule and the assignment of
income doctrine to corporate liquidations. 324 F.2d at 844-49. It should be noted that the
dissent defines the tax benefit rule as "he who receives the benefit must pay the tax." Id at
844. This definition seems to describe the assignment of income doctrine rather than the
tax benefit rule in that it discusses which taxpayer must pay the tax rather than whether
recovery has occurred. See note 7 and text accompanying note 9.
192. 324 F.2d at 849 (Carter, J., dissenting).
193. See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
194. S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 41, at 48-49.
195. Id
196. See notes 24 & 25 supra.
197. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 1, T 11-65, at 11-69 (3d ed. 1971).
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decided section 337 cases but should be decided solely on the facts
of an in-kind liquidation. Moreover, if the property distributed in
kind pursuant to liquidation is the type of property which is pro-
tected from gain under section 337, the need for tax parity should
prevent the liquidating corporation from recognizing gain on the
distribution.'98
Since the courts want to minimize the effect of tax conse-
quences on corporate decision making, the tax parity argument
would likely encourage the courts to apply the tax benefit rule to a
section 336 liquidation in which section 334(a) applies. This is not
to say, however, that the traditional recovery requirement of the
tax benefit rule is satisfied in a section 334(a) liquidation.
VI. SUMMARY
Since the tax benefit rule is a judicial doctrine of historically
limited scope, courts should carefully delineate its scope when ap-
plying it to override a specific nonrecognition provision.
Instead, the Sixth Circuit in Tennessee-Carolina has appar-
ently expanded the tax benefit rule to require recognition of in-
come whenever a corporation transfers expensed assets pursuant
to a liquidation, irrespective of whether that corporation has actu-
ally realized economic benefit from the transfer. Although the
court in Tennessee-Carolina was correct in applying the tax benefit
rule to a section 334(b)(2) liquidation, the court did not expressly
limit its holding to that type of transfer.
If the tax benefit rule overrides section 337 it should also su-
persede section 336 when the parent takes a section 334(b)(2) ba-
sis, since the subsidiary has essentially sold the assets to the
parent. If the parent takes a carryover basis under section
334(b)(1), however, the tax benefit rule should not be invoked. To
do so would deny both the subsidiary and the parent the deduc-
tion.'99 If there is no subsidiary-parent relationship between the
liquidating corporation and the shareholders or if the sharehold-
ers are not corporations so that the shareholders take a fair market
value basis under section 334(a), gain may be recognized depend-
ing on the facts of the case. Furthermore, the liquidating corpora-
tion may have to recognize income, not because there has been an
198. See note 165 supra. The application of the tax benefit rule to section 337 cases
may also usurp the powers of the legislature. See text accompanying notes 166-73 supra.
This argument is less compelling in § 337 cases where the economic recovery requirement
of the tax benefit rule is satisfied.
199. See notes 160 & 161 supra and accompanying text.
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actual recovery under the tax benefit rule, but to ensure results
identical to those of a section 337 liquidation or to preserve
a strict matching of revenues and expenses. Tax parity can be
achieved-and the integrity of the tax benefit rule preserved-by
limiting the application of the doctrine in this manner.
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